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Artificial Cell Research as a Field that
Connects Chemical, Biological and
Philosophical Questions
Anna Deplazes-Zemp*
Abstract: This review article discusses the interdisciplinary nature and implications of artificial cell research. It
starts from two historical theories: Gánti’s chemoton model and the autopoiesis theory by Maturana and Varela.
They both explain the transition from chemical molecules to biological cells. Thesemodels exemplify two different
ways in which disciplines of chemistry, biology and philosophy can profit from each other. In the chemotonmodel,
conclusions from one disciplinary approach are relevant for the other disciplines. In contrast, the autopoiesis
model itself (rather than its conclusions) is transferred from one discipline to the other. The article closes by
underpinning the relevance of artificial cell research for philosophy with reference to the on-going philosophical
debates on emergence, biological functions and biocentrism.
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With the ambition of producing a sim-
ple albeit living cell starting from non-liv-
ing molecules, scientists move from the
classical domain of chemistry to that of
biology. On the one hand, this transition
happens at the level of the research subject,
which changes from non-living molecules
to a living entity. On the other hand, there
is a shift at the conceptual level concern-
ing the research approach. Chemists tra-
ditionally study specific molecules and
singular reactions. In contrast, biological
research concepts, models and questions
focus on the living entity and biologists
are most interested in the function that
chemical molecules and reactions fulfil
in maintaining the life of such entities.
This being said, it must be added that the
emergence of disciplines such as molecu-
lar biology or biochemistry, have blurred
the strict separation between chemistry
and biology in practice. Nevertheless, an-
alytically, the two material categories and
research approaches can still be separated.
Sometimes, studying molecules and stud-
ying living organisms go hand in hand, and
research findings of one classical disci-
pline are often highly relevant for the oth-
er. This does, however, not invalidate the
analytical difference between the chemical
and biological categories with respect to
material, research approach and addressed
questions. Chemical as well as biological
results and models in the context of this
shift raise interesting questions for philos-
ophy. More specifically, they are relevant
for the philosophy of science and bioeth-
ics. The first field reflects on different
methods, concepts, models and findings
of the sciences in question, and the latter
deals with ethical implications related to
the discussed scientific research.
In this short review article, I would
like to discuss artificial cell research in the
context of the three disciplines of chem-
istry, biology and philosophy. Questions
about life have been the research subject
not only of scientific disciplines but also
philosophy, social sciences, humanities,
arts and religions.
[1]
It will not be possi-
ble to address the relationship between all
of these approaches in detail within such
a review article. I thus decided to address
the relationship between chemistry, biolo-
gy and philosophy in two historical mod-
els that are repeatedly being consulted and
quoted by current artificial cell research-
ers. As models that describe and explain
the transition from chemical molecules to
biological cells, they directly relate the lab-
oratory work of artificial researchers to the
more general questions about life. After an
introduction, I will compare the relation
between chemistry and biology in the two
models and the implications for philosophy
that their authors are considering. Finally, I
will give some examples of philosophical-
ly relevant concepts that profit from find-
ings in artificial cell research. This article
will not provide a complete history of arti-
ficial cell research nor will it cover all the
interactions and influences that take place
between the discussed disciplines. Rather,
the aim of this article is to raise the reader’s
awareness and interest for the inter- and
trans-disciplinary nature of artificial cell
research, and to use this research field as an
example to illustrate fruitful interactions
and influences between the disciplines of
chemistry, biology and philosophy.
The Transition from Chemistry to
Biology in Artificial Cell Research
In this article, the phrase ‘artificial cell
research’ is used for research approaches,
which aim at producing minimal living
cells starting from lipid vesicles. The dif-
ferent contributions to this special issue
show that research on and with artificial
cells can pursue different research objec-
tives and address different research ques-
tions. It would be inaccurate to describe
research on artificial cells as a field driven
by the unique aim to produce living cells. It
is not likely that this ambitious aim will be
achieved in the near future; further, scien-
tists focus on more specific and often more
applied research questions. Nevertheless,
at least some artificial cell scientists are in-
terested in the very general – and cross-dis-
ciplinary – question about the conditions
and basic principles of life as well as the
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realistic size and complexity to serve as a
source of all other components.
[6]
What is
important with regards to the relation be-
tween chemistry, biology and philosophy
in artificial cell research, is the implication
of this chemical model for research on life
at the other levels.
As previously mentioned, Gánti’s work
also includes some reflections on the bio-
logical (rather than chemical) research ap-
proach to study life, which focuses on the
criteria of life. The most inventive aspect
of this part of his theory consists in his
distinction between absolute and poten-
tial life criteria. The former must apply to
every living organism, while the latter are
not applicable to every individual organism
but necessary for the “survival of the living
world”.
[4]
He lists five absolute life criteria:
(1) A living organism is an inherent unity
with new qualitative properties compared
to its parts; (2) Metabolism provides for
transformation of external material and
energy by the system; (3) Inherent stability
means that the organisation of a living sys-
tem remains stable in spite of changes in
its environment; (4) An information-car-
rying subsystem contains the instructions
for origin, function and development of the
system; (5) Regulation and control of its
processes is characteristic for living sys-
tems. The first of the three potential life
criteria is (1) growth and reproduction,
which are indispensable for the survival of
a species but cannot be found in each or-
ganism. Gánti’s distinction allows speak-
ing of the controversially discussed feature
of ‘reproduction’ as a life criterion without
being forced to accept the implausible con-
clusion that sterile organisms cannot count
as living entities. Capability of hereditary
change and evolution is the second poten-
tial life criterion (2). Again, the possibility
of potential criteria that concern the living
world is an elegant solution for the prob-
lem that heredity and evolution does not
occur at the level of individuals. These
features can thus not count as criteria to
describe a single organism as living. The
final potential life criterion is (3)mortality.
As Gánti writes “Non-living systems can-
not die”.
[4,p79]
On the other hand, death is
essential for the living world, because it al-
lows for recycling of the organic material.
The ‘potential’ nature of this criterion al-
lows counting it as a criterion even though
there are living systems, such as singular
cells, whose life as an individual ceases by
mitosis rather than by death. In this article,
the question of how these biological crite-
ria are connected to the chemical chemo-
ton model is of particular interest. On the
one hand, the chemoton, as the minimal
living system, must satisfy the life criteria,
which it clearly does as Gánti describes in
detail.
[4]
On the other hand, Gánti writes
that the chemoton theory describes the
The chemoton model is an abstraction
of the minimal living system; it describes
the simplest version of a system that can
be called alive. It is present in every liv-
ing being and absent in non-living entities.
Gánti starts from observations of simple
unicellular organisms and states that all
living cells contain the three subsystems:
cytoplasm, membrane and genetic materi-
al.
[4]
For the chemoton model, he reduces
these components into the following three
abstract subsystems (Fig. 1): first, the met-
abolic subsystem found in the cytoplasm.
It forms a reaction network that, starting
from a nutrient X, produces all compo-
nents to reproduce itself as well as the other
two subsystems. Moreover, it releases the
waste productY. Second, there is the mem-
brane subsystem, which is capable of auto-
catalytic growth, and third the information
subsystem, a reaction system that can pro-
duce macromolecules by template poly-
condensation. Byproducts of this subsys-
tem are used to form the membrane. Gánti
explains that this third subsystem thereby
is able to control and couple the other two
subsystems stoichiometrically and to syn-
chronise growth.
[5]
He understands it as the
abstraction of the genetic material. Modern
protocell scientists refer to this model as
an early schematic model and honour the
stoichiometric coupling of the function-
al elements. However, they also identify
limitations of the model, for instance, that
the chemoton model only considers the
role of metabolism for growth but not for
maintenance.
[5a]
Another criticism refers to
the feature that the information subsystem
does not modulate the metabolism, or that
‘nutrient’ X must be of a practically un-
origin of life. In order to be able to produce
an artificial living cell, one needs to start
from a model that outlines the conditions
and criteria that a minimal cell needs to
fulfil in order to be considered as ‘alive’.
The two historical models that I would like
to introduce are being used by influential
artificial cell researchers as a starting point
to develop their model on how a living
cell could be synthesised from non-living
molecules. The chemoton theory by Tibor
Gánti received, for instance, significant at-
tention in the textbook on protocells edited
by Steen Rasmussen and colleagues.
[2]
The
second example is the autopoiesis theory
by Humberto Maturana and Francisco
Varela, which has repetitively been con-
sulted and discussed by Pier Luigi Luisi
and his collaborators.
[3]
Chemoton Model
The chemoton model was developed
by Tibor Gánti, a chemical engineer from
Hungary. He first published this mod-
el in his book ‘The principle of life’ in
Hungarian in 1971; it was published in
English in 1987.
[4]
In this book, Gánti de-
velops the idea that life can be studied at
different levels. He speaks of life criteria,
which fall into the research field of biolo-
gy, the principle of life concerning the laws
behind these criteria that he describes in
his chemical chemoton theory, and finally,
an approach to study life as a philosophical
category.
[4]
Gánti explicitly discusses and
separates research on life along the three
disciplines examined in this article. His
main focus clearly lies in chemistry, the
first level, where he develops his chemo-
ton model.
Fig. 1. Gánti’s illustra-
tion of his chemoton
model with its three
stoichiometrically
coupled subsystems.
A: metabolic subsys-
tem, T: membrane
subsystem, V: infor-
mation subsystem.
Reproduced with per-
mission from Oxford
University Press.
[4b]
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There is no difference between producer
and product, the producer produces itself.
This autopoietic system is captured within
a determined boundary, which itself is of
course produced by the system. The sys-
tem thus constitutes an autonomous and
clearly defined unity.
Maturana and Varela emphasise that
their theory gets by without reference to a
genome. As mentioned above, they claim
thatthenotionofanautopoieticorganisation
is necessary and sufficient to characterise a
living system.
[8,9]
Some modern supporters
of the autopoiesis theory put this claim for
sufficiency into question. Pier Luigi Luisi
and collaborators support their argument
that autopoiesis is not sufficient to distin-
guish living from non-living systems with
empirical evidence. In collaboration with
Varela, Luisi started to develop models
for experimental production of autopoietic
chemical systems,
[10]
which he and his re-
search group then elaborated and applied
towards the production of ‘autopoietic ves-
icles’ that are not alive.
[11]
They described
such a vesicle as: “a synthetic vesicle that
absorbs a particular molecule from the
medium, and by so doing, reproduces it-
self via an autocatalytic process“.
[3a, p170]
What is the difference between such a ves-
icle and a simple living organism, for in-
stance a bacterium? Bacteria do not take up
their nutrients as a result of ‘coincidental’
chemical reactions. Their pre-existing me-
tabolism only processes specific nutrients.
This is a selective interaction with the en-
vironment. Although Maturana and Varela
did not include this aspect into their theory
of autopoiesis, it nevertheless has an im-
portant place in their work. They discuss
this particular interaction that living things
have with their environment as ‘cogni-
tion’. The choice of this term was unfor-
tunate, because it is often associated with
consciousness, which can certainly not be
found in simple organisms such as bacte-
ria. However, the meaning that Maturana
andVarela give to this term has no connec-
tion to a nervous system or consciousness.
Rather, they argue: “A cognitive system
is a system whose organization defines
a domain of interactions in which it can
act with relevance to the maintenance of
itself.”
[8, p13]
It is thus the organisation of
a living organism and therefore its auto-
poiesis that defines the cognitive domain
of interaction. However, as the mentioned
experiments of Luisi’s group on non-liv-
ing vesicles showed, not every type of au-
topoietic organisation leads to cognition.
Together with the physicist and philos-
opher Michel Bitbol, Luisi argues that it
is the metabolism, which implements the
active and selective interaction with the
environment that is characteristic of living
systems.
[12]
It can thus be concluded that
autopoiesis alone is not sufficient to char-
ginning and end of human life. Whether
brain death or cardiac death counts as
criterion for human death is significant,
for instance, with respect to organ dona-
tion. The removal of a vital organ from
a brain-dead patient seems to be legally
and morally less problematic if the body
counts as ‘dead’. At the beginning of life,
the question of whether a human embryo
should already count as a full human be-
ing is important, for example, for the eth-
ical assessment of abortion. The biologi-
cal definition of the beginning and end of
life has turned out to be difficult, because,
although a brain-dead patient or a human
embryo do not live a typical human life,
they doubtlessly show certain signs of life.
Gánti’s model may provide an explanation
for this discrepancy. He argues that brain
death should be the death criterion in the
case of human life, because secondary life
ends, even if certain primary life functions
continue. Analogously, an oocyte or early
embryo do have primary but not second-
ary life, which starts only with the func-
tioning of the brain, the information and
control subsystem at the secondary level.
However, the ethically relevant question of
why secondary life is the decisive criteri-
on to decide whether an action is morally
legitimate or not cannot be answered with
reference to the scientific model alone. It
demands some additional ethical argumen-
tation, which would go beyond the scope
of this article. The purpose of these com-
ments is to show, how discussions pertain-
ing to ethics and other branches of philos-
ophy can profit from Gánti’s chemical and
biological theory.
Autopoiesis Theory
The second theory that has been influ-
ential concerning the material transition
from chemistry to biology in the research
field of artificial cells is the autopoiesis
theory. Two Chilean biologists, Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela, developed
this theory. Their book ‘Autopoiesis and
Cognition, The Realization of the Living’
was first published in Spanish in 1972; the
English version followed in 1980.
[8]
The
authors start from the question of whether
there is a necessary and sufficient criteri-
on for living organisms. For them, there is
such a criterion, namely in the organisation
of living systems, that allows them to be
autonomous and self-producing unities.
Maturana and Varela introduced the term
‘autopoiesis’ for self-production (ancient
Greek: auto = self, poiesis = creation,
production). Living organisms constant-
ly maintain their own organisation; they
are organised as a network of processes,
which produces components that, in turn,
participate in processes that realise and re-
generate the network. This is to say that
an autopoietic system is self-referential.
“principle of life” or the “laws uniting [the
characteristics of life]”.
[4, p74]
Indeed, each
of the absolute and potential life criteria
depend in one way or another on the organ-
isation described by the chemoton model.
This organisation implies that independ-
ent and stable unities with new properties
arise. In the chemoton model, this organ-
isation obviously includes metabolism
and the information system and allows for
regulation and control. Moreover, it en-
sures the possibility of reproduction and
heredity and thus evolution. Finally, the
organisation can be abolished, which leads
to death of the living system. In this sense,
the chemical model is highly relevant for
the understanding of the biological criteria.
What about the transition from chemis-
try/biology to philosophy?Although Gánti
explains that he does not discuss life as a
philosophical category,
[4]
his final chapter
and another essay titled ‘Levels of life and
death’ do address certain philosophical
implications of his chemoton theory and
life criteria.
[7]
The final chapter deals with
the responsibility of the biologist, which
Gánti explains against the background of
his chemoton theory and life criteria.
[4]
The irreversible functioning of the infor-
mation subsystem, which in existing living
organisms is implemented in the genetic
programme, is the reason that direct or in-
direct effects on this system cause irrevers-
ible changes. Ganti writes: “It is this factor
of irreversibility which makes biological
manipulation incomparably more dan-
gerous than manipulations performed on
non-living systems. One can also produce
catastrophes in the non-living world, but
sooner or later every bad thing comes to an
end. However, in the living world nothing
really comes to an end, neither good nor
bad. […] Thus the effect of these events is
in practice endless”.
[4, p154]
This inherent
risk in “biological manipulations” leads to
particular responsibilities for the biologist.
In the previously mentioned essay,
Gánti advances his theory to animal life;
he speaks of two different kinds of life: pri-
mary life that can be found already at the
prokaryotic level and secondary life, which
only occurs at the level of metazoa (multi-
cellular animals). Interestingly, secondary
life is organised by the same three-sub-
system structure defined by the chemoton
model. Analogous to the membrane sub-
system, there is a subsystem governing the
geometrical structure based on skin and
bones. There is a subsystem involving a
digestive tract, secretory organs and blood
circulation that governs the metabolic pro-
cesses in the whole animal. Finally, there
is an information and control subsystem in
the form of the nervous system.
The distinction between primary and
secondary life is interesting for philosoph-
ical and ethical discussions about the be-
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Luisi identifies another divergence be-
tween the two theories in terms of their
aim and purpose.
[3a, pp178–179]
Although
Gánti himself did not experimentally work
on artificial cells, he explicitly observed
that his theory “involves the strategy of
the synthesis of living systems”
[3a, pp132ff]
and can be consulted to explain the origin
of life.
[3a, pp140ff]
The aim of Maturana and
Varela, in contrast, was to develop a theory
to describe what life is. In the context of
this review article, this difference can be
related to the different disciplinary back-
grounds of the authors. The central aspect
of Gánti’s theory is driven by a chemical
approach even though he also touches on
biological questions with his life criteria.
His main interest concerns the biochemical
reactions that must take place in a mini-
mal living system and how these reactions
are coupled. He supports his model with
various chemical equations. Maturana and
Varela, on the other hand, are biologists
interested in the phenomenon of life, in
what distinguishes living from non-living
things. Therefore, the phenomenological
description was more central than the pro-
cesses that implement this organisation.
However, as discussed, both theories have
far-reaching implications that go beyond
their discipline of origin. Interestingly, the
transfer from one discipline to the other(s)
works differently in the two theories.
Gánti’s ‘chemical’ chemoton model
serves as an explanation for the biological
criteria of life. These criteria are a con-
tinuation and further development of the
chemical theory. They are derived from
the chemoton model. Moreover, this mod-
el serves as an explanation for primary and
secondary life, which explains certain phil-
osophical and ethical implications as dis-
cussed above. In the case of autopoiesis,
it is the model and not its conclusions that
is transferred to the different disciplines.
Luisi, as a chemist, tried to implement the
biological model towards the chemical
construction of artificial cells. This direct
transfer is even more evident in the shift
to social sciences and philosophy, where
again, it is the model of organisation that
is applied to social systems. So, these two
theories give two different examples of
how different academic disciplines can
profit from each other’s research. In the
first example, the results and conclusions
of one discipline are used to address re-
search questions arising in other disci-
plines. In the second case, an explanatory
model in one discipline is used to develop
explanations to questions arising in other
disciplines.
Finally, there is another ‘external’ dif-
ference that does not pertain to the content
of the two theories. It concerns how they
have been received within philosophy. In
contrast to the autopoiesis theory, which
view was part of a “Zeitgeist”, which led
to the simultaneous development of these
similar theories in two entirely different
environments.
[3a, pp177–179]
A closer look at the content of the two
theories reveals more detailed similarities
underneath the holistic approach that both
theories share. Not surprisingly, for both
of them, the compartment or membrane
plays a central role. This certainly is one
reason why these are the theories used by
artificial cell researchers. The metabolism,
too, plays a key role in both theories. This
is true, at least, if one compares the chem-
oton model with Luisi’s version of the au-
topoiesis theory, which includes cognition
(implemented in the metabolism) as a nec-
essary element for life.
With respect to Gánti’s third require-
ment – the information subsystem – the
two theories differ. Although, as stated by
Luisi, neither of the theories sets its prima-
ry focus on nucleic acids, Gánti’s informa-
tional subsystem does refer to the genetic
system as carrying out a function that is
necessary for life. Several of Gánti’s life
criteria are conceptualised as depending on
an informational system in the formof a he-
reditary programme. In contrast, Maturana
and Varela emphasise that reference to a
programme or information system is not
requested for the characterisation of life.
The development of the genetic system
is, for proponents of the autopoiesis the-
ory, one way to implement autopoiesis or
maybe even an evolutionary consequence
of autopoiesis. Reproduction and evolu-
tion depend on autopoietic units and are
therefore secondary to the feature of au-
topoiesis. A kind of Lamarckian evolution
already acts on very simple autopoietic en-
tities. If self-reproductive autopoietic enti-
ties are able to adapt to their environment
and reproduce in an adapted way, they will
be more successful than non-adapted en-
tities. In that sense, Maturana and Varela
write: “In autopoietic systems evolution is
a consequence of self-reproduction.”
[8, p104]
In the course of evolution as it happened
on earth, the nucleic acid system became
the key-feature of the self-reproduction
of living entities. However, theoretical-
ly other models that involve the two key
processes of evolution – namely self-re-
production and variation – are conceivable
for autopoietic entities.
[8, pp102–106]
From
the perspective of Gánti’s theory, one may
question how reproduction of a membrane
subsystem and a metabolism (as required
for cognition) could practically be coordi-
nated, if not by a type of information sub-
system. However, even if an information
system was requested for complex forms
of life as we know them on earth, it could
be argued that it is secondary to the feature
of autopoiesis, since it ‘evolved’ as a con-
sequence of autopoiesis.
acterise life, but together with the condi-
tion of cognition the sufficiency criterion
seems to be fulfilled.
The autopoiesis theory has been highly
influential in social sciences and related
branches of philosophy. De facto it has re-
ceived much more attention in these fields
than in the biological context where it was
developed. Probably the best-known ex-
ample is Niklas Luhmann’s development
of systems theory. He starts from the idea
that social systems consist only of commu-
nication. He further applies the idea of au-
topoiesis to these systems. This means that
social systems are constituted and differen-
tiate from their environment by generating
their own elements (communication) and
maintain themselves strictly by internal
operations.
[13]
Luhmann writes: “Social
systems use communication as their par-
ticular mode of autopoietic reproduction.
Their elements are communications which
are recursively produced and reproduced
by a network of communications and
which cannot exist outside of such a net-
work.”
[14, p174]
In contrast to the biological
context, the material aspects of societies,
such as human bodies, are thus part of the
environment, which itself is not usually
autopoietic.
The original authors of the autopoie-
sis theory had different opinions about the
applicability of their theory to social sys-
tems.Maturana was in favour of the idea of
autopoiesis for social systems. In contrast,
Varela believed that talking about auto-
poiesis in social systems was an “abuse of
language” because the notion of “bounda-
ry” as it was understood in autopoiesis did
not apply to social systems.
[3a, p176]
Comparison and Discussion of
the Chemoton and Autopoiesis
Theories
If one sets out to compare these two
theories with regards to the transition from
chemical molecules to biological cells, one
is first struck by somemarginal similarities
in the circumstances of their origin. Both
theories were developed independently
from each other in countries outside the
scientific centres in the early 1970s, and
they were both first published in languages
that were not influential in sciences. This
background may, to some extent, explain
why neither of the theories received much
attention in the mainstream biochemical
community.Luisi seesother reasons for this
neglect in the fact that neither of the theo-
ries focused on nucleic acids as the main
players, and that they provided systemic
models rather than focusing on the impor-
tance of singular reactions. Nevertheless,
Luisi explains that the idea to look at cel-
lular life from a holistic, systemic point of
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received more attention in social sciences
and philosophy than in biology, the impli-
cations of Gánti’s model for philosophy,
has hardly been discussed within this dis-
cipline. Thus, there would have been po-
tential for an even more fruitful interaction
between the disciplines with respect to the
implications of the chemoton model.
[15]
Further Philosophical Questions
Raised by Research on Artificial
Cells
As mentioned in the outset of this re-
view article, the material transition from
chemical molecules to biological cells ac-
cording to the previously described mod-
els goes along with a conceptual shift in
research questions and approaches. The
focus on singular chemical reactions and
players shifts to the effects that these re-
actions have for the new biological unity.
This latter transition has various impli-
cations for philosophical research, as the
third discipline discussed in this article.
The artificial cell has first been discussed
with respect to its chemical construction
and its biological criteria; now I will ad-
dress some of its philosophical character-
istics. I already mentioned some implica-
tions and applications that resulted directly
from the discussed scientific theories for
philosophy and theoretical social sciences.
In this section, I would like to briefly in-
troduce three other concepts in philosophy
that occur with the material transition from
chemical molecules to a biological cell as
a unity and the associated conceptual shift
in research questions and approaches. I
only refer to these discussions at the level
of simple unicellular forms of life. Most
of these questions are then further extend-
ed to what Gánti would call ‘secondary
life’ in animals and humans, however, this
raises many more issues that cannot be ad-
dressed here.
Emergence
The philosophical discussion, to which
the transition from chemistry to biology
probably contributes most directly, con-
cerns the topic of emergence.
[16]
How can
we understand or explain the relation be-
tween the chemical basis of living systems
and the novel properties that they have as
living unities?
[17]
This difficulty not only
arises at the transition from chemistry to
biology.A classic example to discuss emer-
gent properties is water, whose properties
of being transparent and liquid cannot be
explained with respect to the properties of
singular H
2
O molecules. Marc Bedau de-
fines emergent phenomena as phenomena
that are, on the one hand, generated by un-
derlying processes, and on the other hand,
are autonomous from these very same
processes.
[18]
Emergent properties cannot
be predicted from the non-relational prop-
erties of the components of the system. In
that sense, Bedau suggests that the state of
the system can only be derived from the
state and dynamics of its parts by simula-
tion.
[18]
These ‘emergentist’ positions do
not refer to any non-scientific metaphysi-
cal explanations for emergent phenomena
or properties. They simply suggest that at
a certain level of complexity, we need new
types of scientific explanations, which – at
least at the moment – cannot be derived
from explanations at lower levels.
Functions
The observation that living entities
have different subsystems and elements
that contribute to maintaining this unity,
is the starting point for another debate in
the philosophy of biology. This is the dis-
cussion about biological functions. One
can distinguish between roughly two ap-
proaches to define biological functions.
The first approach addresses what Justin
Garson called “etiological theories of
functions”.
[19]
In a simplified description
of these theories, it can be said that they
try to give an answer to the question “why
is this function there?”, for instance, why
do animals have eyes?
[20]
Modern answers
to this question refer to evolutionary ex-
planations. Studies in evolution biology
are thusmore informative for this approach
than research on artificial cells. The second
approach deals with consequentialist theo-
ries of function in Garson’s sense. These
theories roughly understand functions as
contributions to something, for instance to
the survival of the living organisms.
[21]
The
discussion of functions in the context of ar-
tificial cells primarily supports consequen-
tialist theories. If one understood functions
exclusively etiologically with reference to
evolution, one would need to conclude that
at the level of artificial cells, there cannot
be any biological functions, because they
do not have any evolutionary history.
[22]
Interests
The last point that I will briefly intro-
duce concerns a much smaller debate than
the two previous topics. Biocentrism is a
position in environmental ethics, which ar-
gues that all living organisms are morally
considerable.
[23]
This means that to harm
living organisms can morally only be justi-
fied, if one can give good reasons, why it is
necessary to do so. But why should this be
true specifically for living organisms? For
the answer to this question, at least some
authors directly refer to the previously
mentioned discussion on functions.
[24]
External events can support or interfere
with these functions and thereby with the
maintenance of a living organism. This is
morally relevant, because it means that
something can be good or bad for the liv-
ing system or in other words, it can support
or go against the interest
[25]
of the living
organism. Another condition for having
interests in this sense is related to the auto-
poiesis and chemoton theories. In order to
be able to have interests, living organisms
must be autonomous and able to maintain
themselves, otherwise, their maintenance
would not be in their own interest, but in
that of their maintainer. The biocentric
statement that having interest is the criteri-
on for being morally considerable, because
something can be against the interest for
these entities, is certainly controversial.
Nevertheless, it is a good example for how
scientific conclusions can be informative
for a philosophical subdiscipline.
Conclusions
In the emergence of disciplines such
as synthetic biology, systems biology or
various engineering disciplines (for in-
stance molecular systems engineering) the
boundaries between the classic disciplines
are often blurred. One could speak of new
transdisciplinary research fields. This de-
velopment is explicitly not the focus of the
review article at hand. Here, it was my aim
to discuss how the three different approach-
es of chemistry, biology and philosophy
can profit from each other (summarised in
Fig. 2). It may be difficult to assign artifi-
cial cell research to one classic discipline,
but it is clearly driven by different research
questions, approaches and interpretations
typical for the individual disciplines. I
have tried to show how these approaches
were combined and how they influenced
each other. Two different sources for the
fruitful nature of this interaction have been
described. First, there is inspiration by an
exchange of research results: The notion of
the chemoton model as a minimal living
system supported and explained Gánti’s
life criteria, and served as an explanation
for the ethically relevant distinction be-
tween primary and secondary life. The em-
pirical observations of emergent proper-
ties, the functions of different subsystems
and the implications of these observations
for the new biological unity was the start-
ing point for studies in philosophy of biol-
ogy and bioethics, such as those on emer-
gence, functions and biocentrism. Second,
the exchange of an explanatory model can
be stimulating. The model of autopoietic
self-organisation has been understood as a
criterion for life byMaturana andVarela as
an instruction for chemical synthesis of the
cell by Luisi, and as a model for societal
interactions by Luhmann. It can be hoped,
that other emerging transdisciplinary fields
will be open for an equally stimulating in-
teraction between the involved disciplines.
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Fig. 2. Influences and inspiration between different disciplines in artificial cell research, the chem-
oton theory and the autopoiesis theory. The arrowheads illustrate how one discipline has influ-
enced the others, as discussed in the text. Additional interactions are possible and likely. Artificial
cell researchers have referred to the chemoton- and the autopoiesis theory as historical models
that have influenced their research (1,2). Gánti writes of research on life at three different levels.
The chemoton model describes the principle of life, which explains absolute and potential life cri-
teria (3). These life criteria support, for instance, particular responsibilities of scientists (4) and the
principle of life constitutes the differences and parallels between primary and secondary life (5). In
artificial cell research, the chemical composition of cells informs biological questions on the origin
and minimal conditions of life (6). The production of a living cell goes along with the appearance
of emergent properties, biological functions and – biocentrists argue – moral considerability (7).
The autopoiesis model, which was developed in the biological context, has inspired artificial cell
chemists (8) as well as social scientists and philosophers (9).
